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Abstract
The literature on international tax competition has shown how
increased international mobility of the tax base may create a down-
ward pressure on tax rates and give rise to increased inequality in
disposable income. This paper endogenises the mobility of the tax
base, explaining mobility as a function of the pre-tax income distribu-
tion. We show that increased pre-tax income inequality may reduce
the ability of governments to carry out redistributive policies. More-
over, increased inequality in one country may also negatively aﬀect the
ability of other countries to carry out such policies. The mechanisms
suggested here provide one explanation of the empirical observation
that countries with an egalitarian pre-tax income structure typically
have a more redistributive tax system than more inegalitarian coun-
tries.
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1 Introduction
Income inequalities are rising in most OECD countries (Gottschalk and
Smeeding, 1997). This fact applies to inequalities in income both before
and after taxes and transfers. Evidently, governments have not been able, or
perhaps willing, to fully counter the rising gap in market incomes by imple-
menting more ambitious redistribution programs. In fact, tax rates on high
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incomes have been cut rather than raised in many countries during the last
two decades (OECD, 2000).
Standard closed economy models of taxation and redistribution typically
predict that higher pre-tax inequality should lead to more redistribution, see
for instance see Sandmo (1976) on optimal tax theory and Roberts (1977)
and Meltzer and Richard (1981) on median voter models. The tax compe-
tition literature, on the other hand, emphasises that when the tax base is
mobile across international borders, the ability of governments to tax may be
rather limited.1 In these models, increased inequality in disposable incomes
may be explained by increased mobility in the tax base (e.g. Zodrow and
Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1986, Sinn, 1990).
The present model endogenises the mobility of the tax base, explaining
mobility as a function of the pre-tax income distribution. The mechanism
we suggest is strikingly simple, but, we believe, highly realistic: Increased
concentration of wealth (or income) reduces the relative importance of mo-
bility costs and thus increases the attractiveness of relocating to countries
with lower tax rates.
Facing a more elastic tax base, governments may find it optimal to re-
spond by choosing a lower tax rate. Hence, our paper suggests that increased
pre-tax inequality may be accompanied by lower tax rates and therefore less
redistribution. The paper may in this way shed light on the rather puzzling
empirical observation that countries with more pre-tax inequality tend to be
less redistributive than countries with less inequality (see Perotti, 1996).2
Moreover, the paper describes some important international spillovers: In-
creased inequality in one country may reduce the potential for redistribution
in another.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model,
and in section 3 we analyze the question of how increased pre-tax income
inequality aﬀects tax rates across countries. Section 4 contains discussion
and extensions, and section 5 concludes.
1For empirical evidence on tax competition, see Besley, Griﬃth and Klemm (2001).
2In another paper, Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2001), we analyze the ”redistribution puz-
zle” from a diﬀerent perspective. There, our proposed explanation links inequality with
residential segregation, which in turn negatively aﬀects the feeling of solidarity of the rich
towards the poor and hence their willingness to vote for redistributive taxation.
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2 Model
There are three countries in the model, J = A,B,C, which may be inhabited
by two types of people, a group of rich tax payers and a group of poor transfer
recipients.3 We can think of the tax base as capital or capital income, perhaps
as income derived from human capital. Individual income, or equivalently
wealth, is exogenously given and taxed by national governments according
to the residency principle. This implies that the international allocation of
capital is unaﬀected by taxes and therefore that there is no eﬃciency loss
from taxation.
Tax payers are internationally mobile, and taxes may aﬀect their residen-
tial choice. Since the paper addresses questions of tax motivated migration,
we focus our analysis by assuming that transfer recipients are immobile. Tax
payers may legally reduce their tax burden by migrating to a lower tax ju-
risdiction. There are, however, illegal or quasi-legal ways of reducing the tax
bill that do not necessarily involve the physical relocation of the tax payer.
Examples include the opening of bank accounts or the registering of one’s
firms in low tax countries.
We wish to analyze how the mobility of the tax base aﬀects governments’
ability to collect taxes. Hence, we shall take as given the existence of a polit-
ical will to tax the rich. For simplicity, assume that each government seeks
to maximize the utility of the worst oﬀ group of individuals. As long as the
disposable income of transfer recipients is lower than that of the tax payers
(which we shall assume holds), the governments’ objective is equivalent to
maximizing tax revenues.4 The mobility of the tax base limits the govern-
ments’ ability to collect taxes and introduces a fiscal spillover eﬀect between
countries.
The number of native tax payers in country J is given by sJ . Assume that
sC is small. For convenience, let sC = 0. We then know that in equilibrium
t∗C < t
∗
A, t
∗
B, where tK is the tax rate in country K and the asterisk indicates
the equilibrium value. If this inequality did not hold, country C would have
no tax base and would therefore receive zero tax income. Assuming that
the relocation cost is independent of which country a person moves to, the
migration will be from countries A and B to C, with no mobility between A
and B. The structure of the model facilitates the analysis and also captures
3In section 4 we discuss the case of more than three countries.
4In section 4 we discuss how employing a more general welfare function would aﬀect
the results of our model.
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a realistic feature of international tax competition. Countries with a larger
population of native tax payers (in our model A and B) face competition
for their tax bases from tax havens such as Luxembourg, Monaco, or Jersey
(in our model C). In terms of the present model, it is no coincidence that
tax havens tend to be small countries, since these countries have more to
gain by lowering their tax rates.5 Concerns that harmful tax competition, in
particular from tax havens, will result in a downward pressure on tax rates,
is a major policy issue in the OECD countries. The OECD has identified 35
countries as being tax heavens and has taken steps to reduce the extent of
such practises (OECD, 1998).
Native tax payers of any one country are assumed to have identical, ex-
ogenously given pre-tax incomes. The after-tax income of a person remaining
in his native country K = A,B is
wK(1− tK), (1)
where wK is the pre-tax income of a native tax payer in country K. We
assume that the income of the poor is fixed and always less than the pre-
tax income of the rich. For simplicity, let the income of the poor people
in country A and B be identical and equal to zero. This implies that wK
defines both the absolute disposable income of a rich individual in K and the
income gap between rich and poor in that country. We can thus view wK as
a measure of pre-tax inequality.
Tax payers compare their post-tax income at home with the post-tax
income they could get in the low tax country, taking into account that a move
to another country involves certain relocation costs. Examples of relocation
costs include searching for a new location (which may involve hiring tax
lawyers), moving to the new place (perhaps setting up a new headquarters),
operating in a new environment (which may involve building up a new social
and professional network and possibly learning a new language), and perhaps
the expected disutility of being caught doing something illegal and being
punished for it (or perhaps the bad conscience of doing something illegal, even
if the chances of being caught are negligible). We shall allow for diﬀerences in
relocation costs both between types of individuals, with “types” here defined
by the level of pre-tax income, and between individuals within each type.
5This mechanism is analyzed in Kanbur and Keen (1993).
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Since all tax payers who are natives of the same country have the same pre-
tax income they are also of the same type. The after-tax income of a person
i who leaves his native country K for country C is
wK(1− tC)− µiK , (2)
where µiK = µ
i (wK) is the relocation cost for this individual. Note that
we have assumed that pre-tax income is unaﬀected by choice of location.
Hence, relocation in this model is purely tax-motivated. Certainly, in reality
locational choice is guided by a number of reasons in addition to that of
reducing the tax bill, but to focus on the issue at hand we disregard such
additional factors.
A person will leave for country C if the after-tax income in country K
is lower than the after-tax income in country C minus relocation costs. A
person i with a pre-tax income of wK is indiﬀerent between staying in K or
moving to C when
wK(1− tK) = wK(1− tC)− µiK . (3)
From (3) we can easily derive the critical relocation cost that makes a
person indiﬀerent between staying or leaving as
µ˜K = wK(tK − tC). (4)
People characterized by µiK < µ˜K will leave K for country C. For analyt-
ical convenience, let the relocation cost be uniformly distributed within the
group of rich individuals, with the support (0, µ¯K), where µ¯K ≡ µ¯ (wK) is the
highest relocation cost for an individual living in K. The share of country
K’s native tax payers that move to country C in equilibrium can then be
found as
σK ≡ min( µ˜K
µ¯K
, 1) = min
µ
wK(tK − tC)
µ¯K
, 1
¶
, (5)
which also implies that the number of tax payers remaining in country
K, ρK, equals
ρK = sK(1− σK). (6)
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The objective functions of countries K and C can then be written as
TK = tKwKρK, (7)
TC = tCwA(sA − ρA) + tCwB(sB − ρB), (8)
which, using (5) and (6), and the fact that no country will set their tax rate
so high that they lose all their tax payers, i.e., that σK < 1, can be expressed
as
TK = tKwKsK
µ
1− wK (tK − tC)
µ¯K
¶
, (9)
TC = tCwAsA(
wA(tA − tC)
µ¯A
) + tCwBsB(
wB(tB − tC)
µ¯B
). (10)
Maximizing (9) with respect to tK , country K’s reaction function can be
derived from the first order condition as
tK (tC) =
µ¯K
2wK
+
tC
2
. (11)
We observe that country K’s optimal tax rate is increasing in tC. Simi-
larly, country C’s reaction function can be derived from (10) as
tC (tA, tB) =
1
2
w2AsAtAµ¯B + w
2
BsBtBµ¯A
w2AsAµ¯B + w
2
BsBµ¯A
. (12)
Note that while the optimal taxes for countries A and B are not directly
interlinked, a change in one of the two countries’ tax rates, say tA, triggers a
response by country C, which in turn aﬀects the optimal tax rate of country
B. From (11) and (12) we can derive the Nash-equilibrium tax rates. These
are reported in Appendix A.
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Before addressing the questions motivating our study, let us briefly discuss
the importance of the relation between pre-tax income and relocation costs.
From (5) it can be shown that
sign
µ
∂σK
∂wK
¶
= sign (1− εK) ,
where
εK ≡ ∂µ¯K
∂wK
wK
µ¯K
.
i.e., the elasticity of the upper support of the relocation cost with respect
to pre-tax income. This elasticity can thus be seen as a measure of the
elasticity of the tax base. If εK < 1, the richer are the tax payers in country
K, the more responsive they are to international diﬀerences in tax rates. For
instance, if relocation costs are independent of income levels, then εK = 0. If
higher income is associated with higher general skills that make international
relocation easier, then εK < 0. If εK > 1, the mobility of tax payers in K is
reduced as the pre-tax income of the natives goes up. This could perhaps be
the case if living in one’s native country is a luxury good.
Intuitively it seems reasonable to assume that individuals with a high
pre-tax income are more likely to change residency in response to tax dif-
ferentials than people with lower incomes, i.e., that εK < 1. There is also
some empirically evidence to support this intuition. For instance, Schwartz
(1973), show that people endowed with more human capital are more mobile
than those with less human capital, which in our model would suggest that
(∂µ¯K/∂wK) < 0, implying that εK < 0. The qualitative results of our model
depend crucially on whether εK is larger or smaller than unity. We present
εK < 1 as the “benchmark” case, but also comment on how our results are
aﬀected by εK > 1.
3 Analysis
We are primarily concerned with two questions. First, how does increased
pre-tax income inequality on an international scale aﬀect tax rates across
countries? We call this the symmetric case. Second, how does increased
inequality in some countries aﬀect tax rates across countries? The answer
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to this second question also allows us to address the issue of international
spillovers and the redistribution puzzle discussed in the introduction. This
is the asymmetric case.
3.1 The symmetric case
To answer the first question, we study the case of complete symmetry between
countries A and B. Hence, sA = sB = s, wA = wB = w, which in turn implies
that µ¯A = µ¯B = µ¯. From Appendix A, we can then find the equilibrium tax
rates as
t∗A = t
∗
B =
2µ¯
3w
, (13)
t∗C =
µ¯
3w
. (14)
From these equations, given that ε < 1, we can make the following ob-
servation:
Proposition 1 An increase in the pre-tax income of tax payers reduces the
equilibrium tax rates in all countries.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Since w measures pre-tax income inequality, this proposition also states
that increased pre-tax inequality reduces equilibrium tax rates. The intuition
for the proposition is straightforward: An increase in income increases the
benefit of being located in a low-tax jurisdiction. If the costs of relocation
are not increasing too much with income, i.e., given that ε < 1, higher
income means that more people will leave the high tax countries for any
given diﬀerence in tax rate between high and low tax countries. In this
sense, the tax base has become more elastic. This in turn intensifies tax
competition, leading to lower tax rates in equilibrium. The opposite holds
for ε > 1. Inserting (13) into (9) and (14) into (10), we find that:
T ∗K =
4sµ¯
9
, T ∗C =
2sµ¯
9
. (15)
Evidently, total tax income in equilibrium falls with w if ε < 0, and
increases with w if ε > 0. While an increase in per capita income increases
the tax base, it also increases its elasticity with respect to tax rates. If ε < 0,
the first eﬀect dominates and if ε > 0, the second eﬀect dominates.
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3.2 The asymmetric case
How does increased concentration of wealth in one country aﬀect interna-
tional tax rates? We consider two cases. In the first, we assume that GDP
per capita is the same in A and B, but that tax payers may be richer in one
country than in another. In the second case we allow for diﬀerences in GDP
per capita between A and B.
We start by first focussing exclusively on the distribution of income. As-
sume therefore that the total population in A and B and the two countries’
average incomes are the same. This means that sAwA = sBwB ≡ W . Let B
be the country experiencing an increased concentration of wealth, implying
an increase in wB and a reduction in sB (and therefore an increase in the
number of poor people). Since the number of tax payers and their pre-tax
income in A by assumption are unchanged, we can make the following nor-
malization; sA = µ¯A = 1. From Appendix A, the equilibrium tax rates can
now be expressed as
t∗A =
5sBµ¯B + 3
6W (sBµ¯B + 1)
, (16)
t∗B =
5sBµ¯B + 3 (sBµ¯B)
2
6W (sBµ¯B + 1)
, (17)
t∗C =
2sBµ¯B
3W (sBµ¯B + 1)
. (18)
Given εB < 1, it is straightforward to demonstrate that
Proposition 2 i) An increase in the concentration of pre-tax income in one
country leads to lower tax rates in all countries; ii) The reduction in the tax
rate is largest in the country where the increased concentration of pre-tax
income takes place.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Hence, if ε < 1 an increase in inequality abroad reduces the scope for
redistribution at home. If ε > 1, the opposite result holds. As explained
earlier, the more wealthy are tax payers in a country, in this case country
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B, the more elastic is the tax base in this country. This intensifies the tax
competition between country B and C. The resulting lower tax rates in C
leads to lower tax rates also in A. However, since the elasticity of the tax
base in A is unchanged, and thus lower than in country B, the reduction in
tA is less than that of tB. Hence, although increased pre-tax inequality in one
country leads to a larger gap between the disposable income of rich and poor
in all countries, countries with an egalitarian pre-tax income distribution
are less vulnerable to tax competition than countries with a more unequal
income distribution. Comparing the situation in A and B we can easily see
that:
Corollary 1 The country with the more unequal pre-tax income distribution
has the lower tax rate.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In light of this corollary, our model may thus provide an explanation for
what we in the introduction called the redistribution puzzle, i.e., the obser-
vation that countries with more inegalitarian pre-tax income distributions
tend to be less redistributive than more egalitarian societies.
So far we have studied the eﬀect of income distribution on tax competition
while keeping the size of the economies in A and B identical. Now, we turn
our attention to how diﬀerences in the aggregate level of income in these
countries may aﬀect tax rates in equilibrium. Varying the number of the
rich people in country B, and assuming a constant wB, we can derive the
following proposition (given that εB < 1):
Proposition 3 A change in the number of tax payers has no eﬀect on equi-
librium tax rates if tax payers everywhere have equal income. If tax payers
in one country, say country B, are richer (poorer) than in the other, then
increasing the number of tax payers in B reduces (increases) the equilibrium
tax rates in all countries.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The opposite result holds for εB > 1. Intuitively, an increase in sB
increases the weight that country C attaches to country B’s tax base. The
eﬀect this has on C’s tax rate depends on whether B is a high income country
or a lower income country. If wB > wA, and if increasing income does not
increase costs of mobility too much, i.e., for εB < 1, then country B has
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the more elastic tax base, and hence an increase in sB increases the overall
elasticity of the tax base in the view of C. The optimal response of C is
therefore to lower its tax rate, leading to an overall reduction in tax rates.
Conversely, if wB < wA and εB < 1, an increase in sB reduces the overall
elasticity of the tax base, leading to higher equilibrium tax rates everywhere.
4 Discussion and extensions
The analysis above is based on the assumption that the governments’ ob-
jective is to maximize the welfare of the poor. How would our results be
aﬀected if the governments instead had been concerned with maximizing the
average welfare in the economy? We can approach this question by looking at
the situation where the revenue maximizing government has set its tax rate
optimally. In this situation the net revenue eﬀect from a marginal increase
in the tax rate is zero, since the increased tax revenue collected from the rich
individuals who stay in the country is exactly equal to the loss in tax revenue
from the tax payers who decide to move. If the government had given some
weight to the utility of the rich individuals, this tax rate would have been
too high: a reduction in the tax rate would have had no eﬀect on the utility
of the poor, but it would have increased the utility of the rich individuals
who stay in the country.
Giving some weight to the rich will result in a larger reduction in the
tax rate (relative to the tax rate that maximizes tax revenues) the larger
is the pre-tax income equality. The reason is simply that, given decreasing
marginal utility of income, the welfare gain from a reduction in the tax rate
is larger when the tax payers are not so rich. This is a well known result from
the optimal tax literature. Hence, assigning positive weight to the utility of
the rich would modify, and possibly even reverse, our result that countries
with a more unequal pre-tax distribution have lower tax rates. However, the
mechanisms that we analyse in the present paper would apply even if we
were to assign positive weight to the welfare of the rich. Adding another
consideration, namely the intensity in the political will to redistribute, does
not make our results concerning the ability to tax irrelevant.
Our analysis has considered the interaction between three countries. In-
creasing the number of high tax countries will not aﬀect the model in any
important way. Adding a new country of type A or type B will have exactly
the same eﬀect as increasing the size of these countries, an experiment we
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conducted in Section 3.3. From this we can conclude that including a country
with above average inequality would result in lower tax rates and therefore
a larger gap in disposable incomes internationally, while including a country
with a more equal pre-tax income distribution than the average would work
in the opposite direction.
On the other hand, introducing another low-tax country, i.e., another tax
haven, will aﬀect the equilibrium in the model in a more significant way. If
the low-tax countries engage in Bertrand competition over tax rates, their
taxes will be pushed toward zero. In this case it follows from (11) that
the tax rates for the high-tax countries are given by tK (0) =
µ¯K
2wK
. Since
the tax rates in the low-tax countries are unaﬀected by the taxes set in the
high-tax countries, there will not be any interdependence between the high-
tax countries in this situation. The tax rate in each country would then be
determined by national factors alone.
5 Concluding remarks
Increased income inequality is often seen as the result of increased tax com-
petition, which in turn is explained in terms of increased mobility of the tax
base. The basic hypothesis in the present paper is that the mobility of the
tax base is linked to the pre-tax income distribution. Based on this assump-
tion, we show that increased inequality in pre-tax income levels may force
governments to reduce taxes on the rich, thus increasing the gap in dispos-
able income between rich and poor in society. We also show that increased
pre-tax inequality in one country may aﬀect redistributive policies in other
countries. More specifically, increased pre-tax inequality in one country may
reduce the potential for redistribution in another.
Empirical evidence suggests that countries with a large gap in pre-tax
income levels between rich and poor are less redistributive than countries
which are more egalitarian in this respect. At least if we follow the logic of
optimal tax theory and median voter models, this observation is puzzling.
The present paper points to one possible explanation to this puzzle. If the
elasticity of the tax base is increasing in the concentration of income and
wealth, increased concentration of income and wealth reduces the ability of
governments to carry out redistribution policies.
It is often presumed that globalization presents a special challenge to
egalitarian countries. However, we show that countries with an egalitarian
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pre-tax income distribution might be less vulnerable to tax competition than
countries with a more unequal income distribution.
An interesting extension to the present model would be to endogenize
not only redistribution, and therefore disposable income, but also pre-tax
income. Many would argue that the mobility of factors of production, goods
and services and technology, in short, what is often referred to as ”globaliza-
tion”, may explain the rising inequality in pre-tax income distribution that
we observe in many OECD countries. Adding mechanisms that endogenize
both pre-tax and post-tax income distribution could provide some additional,
interesting insights. We leave this for further research.
Appendix A
t∗A =
µ¯A
6
4w2AsAµ¯B + 3w
2
BsBµ¯A + wAwBsBµ¯B
wA (w2BsBµ¯A + w
2
AsAµ¯B)
, (A1)
t∗B =
µ¯B
6
4w2BsBµ¯A + 3w
2
AsAµ¯B + wBwAsAµ¯A
wB (w2BsBµ¯A + w
2
AsAµ¯B)
, (A2)
t∗C =
µ¯Aµ¯B
3
(sAwA + wBsB)
(w2AsAµ¯B + w
2
BsBµ¯A)
. (A3)
Appendix B
From (13) and (14) we can easily find that
∂t∗A
∂w
=
∂t∗B
∂w
=
2µ¯
3w2
(ε− 1) , (A4)
∂t∗C
∂w
=
µ¯
3w2
(ε− 1) , (A5)
where ε ≡ ∂µ¯
∂w
w
µ¯
. Clearly, ∂t
∗
A
∂w
,
∂t∗B
∂w
,
∂t∗C
∂w
are negative if ε < 1 and positive if
ε > 1. This proves Proposition 1.
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Appendix C
Define sBµ¯B ≡ x (sB) ≡ x. From (16),(17), and (18) we find that
∂t∗A
∂sB
=
∂x (sB)
∂sB
(12W ) , (A6)
∂t∗B
∂sB
=
∂x (sB)
∂sB
¡
30Wx+ 18Wx2
¢
, (A7)
∂t∗C
∂sB
=
∂x (sB)
∂sB
(6W ) . (A8)
Since the terms in the parenthesis in (A6)-(A8) are all positive, the sign
of these derivatives depends on the sign of ∂x(sB)
∂sB
. Some algebra shows that
∂x (sB)
∂sB
= µ¯B + sB
∂µ¯B
∂sB
= µ¯B (1− εB) , (A9)
where we have used the fact that W = wBsB and that
∂µ¯B
∂sB
=
∂µ¯B
∂wB
∂wB
∂sB
,
∂wB
∂sB
= − W
(sB)
2 =
wB
sB
.
Hence,
sign
µ
∂t∗J
∂sB
¶
= sign (1− εB) , J = A,B,C
If, as we believe, εB < 1, then increased (reduced) concentration of wealth
in countryB, i.e., a reduction (increase) in sB, reduces (increases) equilibrium
tax rates in all countries. If εB > 1, the opposite result holds. This proves
part one of Proposition 2.
Turning to part two of Proposition 2, define τA ≡ t
∗
B
t∗A
and τC ≡ t
∗
B
t∗C
. From
(16),(17), and (18), we find that
τA =
5x+ 3x2
5x+ 3
14
and
τC =
5 + 3x
4
.
It is straightforward to show that
∂τA
∂sB
=
∂x (sB)
∂sB
¡
15x2 + 18x
¢
, (A10)
∂τC
∂sB
=
∂x (sB)
∂sB
µ
3
4
¶
. (A11)
Since the parentheses in (A10) and (A11) are both positive, the sign of
the derivatives is determined by ∂x(sB)
∂sB
, which from (A9) we know has the
sign of (1− εB). Hence:
sign
µ
∂τL
∂sB
¶
= sign (1− εB) , L = A,C.
If εB < 1, then increased (reduced) concentration of wealth in country B,
i.e., a reduction (increase) in sB, reduces (increases) equilibrium tax rates in
that country more than in the other countries. If εB < 1, the opposite result
holds. This proves part two of proposition 2.
From (A10) and the discussion above, we also know that if sB < 1, i.e.,
if there is a greater concentration of wealth in B than in A, and given that
εB < 1, then the equilibrium tax rate in B will also be lower than that in A.
This proves Corollary 1.
Appendix D
From (11) we know that a change in the number or tax payers in K =
A,B, i.e., sK , aﬀects these countries’ tax rates only via its eﬀect on tC .
Hence, to investigate the impact of the number of tax payers on equilibrium
tax rates, it suﬃces to consider the eﬀect on tC . Again, let the situation in A
be unchanged which means that we without loss of generality can normalize
wA and sA to unity. Wen can then simplify (A3) to
t∗C =
µ¯Aµ¯B
3
(1 + wBsB)
(µ¯B + w
2
BsBµ¯A)
. (A12)
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From (A12) we can show that
sign(
∂t∗C
∂sB
) = sign(µ¯B − wBµ¯A). (A13)
Evidently, in the symmetric case of wB = wA = 1, which also implies
µ¯B = µ¯A, the sign of (A13) is zero. Hence, when tax payers have equal pre-
tax incomes everywhere, their number does not aﬀect equilibrium tax rates.
What is the sign of (A13) if wB > wA? The answer can be found by taking
the derivative of (A13) with respect to wB:
sign(
∂ (t∗C)
2
∂sB∂wB
) = sign(
∂µ¯B
∂wB
1
µ¯A
− 1). (A14)
Evaluated at the symmetric case of wB = wA = 1 and therefore µ¯B = µ¯A,
the right hand side of (A14) reduces to sign (εB − 1). Hence, if wB > wA
and εB < 1, an increase (reduction) in the number of tax payers in B reduces
(increases) the equilibrium tax rate in C and therefore changes tax rates in
A and B in the same direction. If wB < wA, an increase (reduction) in the
number of tax payers in B increases (reduces) the equilibrium tax rate in C
and again changes tax rates in A and B in the same direction. If εB > 1,
the impact on t∗C of a change in sB would be the opposite. This proves
Proposition 3.
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